Power Structures and the View of Non-Productive Education
Sunday, October 16, 2005
It has been obvious to me for a while, as I am sure it has been to many of you, that there is a lack of appreciation for academic endeavors that are seen as non-productive. Included in this category would be the study of: art, literature, poetry, philosophy, and pretty much anything else that one couldn't be assured of putting to practical use following graduation.
Based on my Foucaultian view of the world, I had assumed that this had something to do with power structures trying to keep a limit on the amount of creativity and abstract thinking taking place within the confines of the system (which obviously would serve to reduce the amount of dissension within the system and thereby reduce the risk of its demise).
I have recently stumbled upon something that has changed my perspective on this problem.
In The genealogy of Morals, essay 3, section 7, Nietzsche says,
"Every animal-therefore la bete philosophe, too-instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power; every animal abhors, just as instinctively and with a subtlety of discernment that is higher than all reason, every kind of intrusion or hindrance that obstructs or could obstruct this path to the optimum (I am not speaking of its path to happiness, but its path to power, to action, to the most powerful activity, and in most cases actually its path to unhappiness)."
From this assertion he goes on to claim that the meaning of the ascetic ideal for the philosopher is that it provides the "optimum condition for the highest and boldest spirituality...he does not deny 'existence,' he rather affirms his existence and only his existence." Thus the optimum conditions under which the philosopher could or would function are those prescribed by the ascetic ideal.
In section 8 he goes on to say that there are "three great slogans" that characterize the life of all "great, fruitful, inventive spirits," these are: "poverty, humility, chastity." Later in this same section these are referred to as "fame, princes, and women." So the question arises, or at least it did for me, if these are necessary for there to be great spirits of philosophy, people like "Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer" etc, then is it proper to say that such an outlook on non-productive academics be attributed to a power structure acting upon these disciplines, or would it be more correct to say that this is a result of the 'will' of the discipline itself? In other words, is the necessity for the creation of the optimal conditions for the functioning of the philosopher the reason philosophical academic pursuits are not glamorous, and do not garner riches, and thus shunned by the community for whom these things are seen as the highest aspirations? This, it would seem, implies a reversal of culpability. We (philosophers) are to blame for our own position precisely because this is the position we must fill in order to become great. Poverty, humility and chastity are the breeding ground for the great mind, on this conception, and something that is sought after by all philosophical minds. Hence those who achieve philosophical greatness (despite their desire not to have done so) have created, both by their disposition toward the world and as the standard to which any aspiring great mind must overcome, a perception of philosophy for those non-philosophers such that the conditions for the existence of the philosopher are assured to exist.
If this is accepted and/or correct then would it also be the case that this is not limiting creativity, at least not for the philosophical mind, but actually attempting to produce it? And to the extent that it is limited, isn't this limitation enacted for the sake of philosophy, and by philosophy? In other words, if the above observation is accepted, we are the limiting factor not an outside power structure; we are responsible not an ambiguous other.
Based on my Foucaultian view of the world, I had assumed that this had something to do with power structures trying to keep a limit on the amount of creativity and abstract thinking taking place within the confines of the system (which obviously would serve to reduce the amount of dissension within the system and thereby reduce the risk of its demise).
I have recently stumbled upon something that has changed my perspective on this problem.
In The genealogy of Morals, essay 3, section 7, Nietzsche says,
"Every animal-therefore la bete philosophe, too-instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power; every animal abhors, just as instinctively and with a subtlety of discernment that is higher than all reason, every kind of intrusion or hindrance that obstructs or could obstruct this path to the optimum (I am not speaking of its path to happiness, but its path to power, to action, to the most powerful activity, and in most cases actually its path to unhappiness)."
From this assertion he goes on to claim that the meaning of the ascetic ideal for the philosopher is that it provides the "optimum condition for the highest and boldest spirituality...he does not deny 'existence,' he rather affirms his existence and only his existence." Thus the optimum conditions under which the philosopher could or would function are those prescribed by the ascetic ideal.
In section 8 he goes on to say that there are "three great slogans" that characterize the life of all "great, fruitful, inventive spirits," these are: "poverty, humility, chastity." Later in this same section these are referred to as "fame, princes, and women." So the question arises, or at least it did for me, if these are necessary for there to be great spirits of philosophy, people like "Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer" etc, then is it proper to say that such an outlook on non-productive academics be attributed to a power structure acting upon these disciplines, or would it be more correct to say that this is a result of the 'will' of the discipline itself? In other words, is the necessity for the creation of the optimal conditions for the functioning of the philosopher the reason philosophical academic pursuits are not glamorous, and do not garner riches, and thus shunned by the community for whom these things are seen as the highest aspirations? This, it would seem, implies a reversal of culpability. We (philosophers) are to blame for our own position precisely because this is the position we must fill in order to become great. Poverty, humility and chastity are the breeding ground for the great mind, on this conception, and something that is sought after by all philosophical minds. Hence those who achieve philosophical greatness (despite their desire not to have done so) have created, both by their disposition toward the world and as the standard to which any aspiring great mind must overcome, a perception of philosophy for those non-philosophers such that the conditions for the existence of the philosopher are assured to exist.
If this is accepted and/or correct then would it also be the case that this is not limiting creativity, at least not for the philosophical mind, but actually attempting to produce it? And to the extent that it is limited, isn't this limitation enacted for the sake of philosophy, and by philosophy? In other words, if the above observation is accepted, we are the limiting factor not an outside power structure; we are responsible not an ambiguous other.
posted by Seemingly Confused at
12:45 AM
Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering --every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in pieces any one who says the contrary.
They throng about the captain, begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any time they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such a manner as might be expected of them.
Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a good-for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like or not-the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling.
Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing?
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